INTRODUCTION
In 1616, Sir Edward Coke, Chief Justice of the King's Bench, whose stubborn advocacy on behalf of the common law lost him his official position, 1 found himself able to analogize the discretionary capacity of the jury, chosen from the community, with the equitable powers of the Chancellor, appointed by the King, and claim that "the jury are ). An agreement had been made between the plaintiff and the defendant about certain lands, by which the defendant stated that, if the land he had sold the plaintiff was less than he had calculated, he would pay the plaintiff eleven pounds per acre. The plaintiff alleged that the damages for such an underestimate were seven hundred pounds. However, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff of four hundred pounds. On appeal, the allegation was that "of necessity if as many acres were owed as the plaintiff argued, they [the jury] should find 700l. damage and if they did not find that as many were owed the verdict should not have been found for the plaintiff" ["de necessitie si tant acres deessent come le plaintiff ad allege ils duissoint trover 700l. damage et sils ne trove que tants deessent le verdict duissoit ester trove ver le plaintiff"]. The reporter noted that, in his reply for the court, "Coke thought [the verdict] was fine since there were various reasons why in equity they [the jury] should not have given as great damages as that amount, since it seemed here that the jurors were chancellors" ["Coke semble est assets bon car poient ester divers causes pur que en equitie ils ne duissoint doner tant damages come ceo amount, car semble icy que le jurors fueront chancellors . . . ."]. The translations are mine.
4 Court of Chancery. 7 As this Article contends, the procedural virtues and the philosophical goals of the jury and of the Chancellor as expressed by their adherents were very similar, but the disparities in the origins of their authority-the jury a body designed to represent local men of the community and the Chancellor considered almost a cipher for the King-led opponents in the English Revolution and its aftermath to resist one institution or the other. Fluctuations in the relative strength and weakness of the common law jury and judges in equity thus came to depend on political struggles rather than disagreement about methods of adjudication.
After briefly elaborating upon the conception of equity and the development of Chancery in Part I, the Article turns, in Part II, to analyzing the rhetoric of conscience and equity employed to describe the sources of both the Chancellor's and the jury's legal decision-making. Part III then considers certain procedural resemblances between the activities of the jury and the Chancellor. These include the respective modes of evaluating evidence, the finality of each entity's verdict or judgment, and the assertion by each of an ability-and, above all, a right-to decide both fact and law. Political objections to vesting the capacity to determine the law as well as the facts in either the 7 In The Law of Proof in Early Modern Equity, Michael Macnair suggests a connection between the ideological battles over the jury and those over equity jurisdiction in the seventeenth century, but does not elaborate the link. As he writes, [T] he question of trial by jury was in the seventeenth century (as, indeed, later) a politically contested issue. Jury trial was, in fact, an aspect of the 'ancient constitution' ideology. In this context the events of 1640-60 and 1689 gave a substantial boost to the . . . argument for the superiority of jury trial. The Chancery escaped abolition in the Civil War and Interregnum, but the other major English bill courts were destroyed and not restored. In this context an ideological shift towards 'juryism' may have been an element feeding in, together with the decline of examination on commission and the general shift towards a subjective standard of proof, to the expansion of the feigned issue procedure. Michael R.T. Macnair, The Law of Proof in Early Modern Equity (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1999), 286. 5 jury or the Chancellor were particularly strong. As Part IV demonstrates, at the time of the Founding, controversy over this issue continued unabated, although the target of censure became the Supreme Court, rather than Chancery.
The Article thus elucidates some of the reasons for the rise of one institution-the jury-over another-Chancery-and illuminates the implications of this displacement for the debates about the role of the Supreme Court in the federal judiciary of the United States. It also, however, suggests the fundamental resemblance between the type of discretion exercised by both judge and jury-in contrast with that employed by the legislative branch. 8 Today, when the other branches are increasingly attempting to limit the scope of both judicial and jury decision-making, it is useful to recall that, historically, discretion may have been redistributed within the "judicial branch," but was not displaced outside it. Although seemingly contradictory, with Mistretta emphasizing judges' discretion and Apprendi insisting instead on the constraints on such discretion, the historical accounts provided in the two cases can be reconciled; evidence for the different claims is simply derived from periods in which judge or jury enjoyed greater or lesser power. Conceptually, however, the conflict can most readily be resolved by first recognizing the historical struggle between judge and jury, then realizing that discretion resides in the judicial branch as a whole, rather than in either of its components to the exclusion of the other. 10 The historical account contained in this paragraph is derived primarily from A.T. The reasons of the institution of this officina brevium are many; first, that it might appear, that all power of judicature whatsoever flowed from the King, and therefore there was a summonce even to the peers in parliament, that sat in jure proprio; so likewise for the lower house of commons; the basis of the same was made by writs that issued out of this court, and were returned into the same office;
and also in every judicature there were particular patents, which shewed the extent of their commissions, and that their power was derived from the crown.
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Early Chancellors were often religious figures rather than common lawyers, and exercised their jurisdiction both criminally and civilly. 
II SUBSTANTIVE SIMILARITIES: THE RHETORIC OF CONSCIENCE AND EQUITY
In what, then, did the conceptions of justice shared by proponents of the jury and
Chancery consist? The most central terms were "equity" itself and "conscience." In both cases this "equity" was considered grounded in the law of reason, a type of natural law.
A slight division arose over this issue, however, not between Chancery and the jury, but instead between advocates of the jury and writers on equity, on the one hand, and the judicial branch of the common law itself, on the other. Whereas common lawyers following in the footsteps of Sir Edward Coke believed that the law of reason was 22 Ibid., 48-49. man." 27 Thomas Green has suggested in Verdict According to Conscience that tracts on the jury employed the same terminology, stating of the Levellers-perhaps the most radical of the groups involved in the English Revolution,-that they "constantly invoked the notion of the 'reason' and 'equity' of the law" and also believed that, "Whether the jury acted on its own or at the behest of the bench, it applied the law according to 'conscience' in order to ensure that the defendant would receive his just deserts."
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Discussions of conscience correspond to a sense both that the trier of factwhether jury or Chancellor-will make an individualized determination in each particular case, adjusting the mandates of common law precedents or statutory precepts to fit the situation, and that conscience will dictate mercy in certain circumstances where the penalty does not fit the crime. Although Hake viewed equity as ensconced within the law itself rather than emanating from the discretionary judgments of the Chancellor or jury, 29 he explained in Epieikeia how the common law had come to contain certain exceptions to the application of its penalties based upon the defendant's lack of malice. These included exempting children who had committed felonies from the penalty of death, not 29 Hake took the position that equity inhered in the law rather than in the probity of the individual pronouncing the law: Nowe the onely matter in question between us is this, whether this Equity thus adhybited be the righteousnes of the judge or expositor of the lawe, or of the lawe itself. And, for myne owne opinion, I conceive it somewhat cleere that if the lawe we speake of be a good lawe and well grounded, then the Equity that must be used to the correction of the generalitye thereof cannot be said to be the Equitye of the judge, but of the lawe . . . . Epieikeia, 11.
considering a wife guilty of robbery who has stolen on the command of her husband, and acquitting a man of burglary who has broken into a house to obtain food. 30 Providing an alternative genealogy of similar provisions in the law, Greene has shown how thirteenthand fourteenth-century juries, which "acted upon their own extralegal notion of culpable homicide," 31 created narratives that would subject certain defendants on trial for murder to a penalty lesser than death. On this account, the jury implemented the same equity that the common law came to acknowledge. The actual institution of Chancery retained some significance in this process as well; the "pardon of course" that defendants would receive after jury verdicts suggesting that they had operated in self-defense was, notably, processed through Chancery itself.
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References to "reason" in the context of equity and conscience were not, however, Emphasizing the connection between the juryman's oath and the exercise of his conscience, Walwyn envisioned conscience both as involving a certain mitigation of positive law-through "setting the Oppressed free"-and as ignoring the status and place of those undergoing judgment and instead conducing to an impartial determination.
Rather than considering the nuances of the law, the jury Walwyn contemplated should judge right and wrong with broad strokes. Addressing Robinson's claim that a few clever individuals dominate juries, Walwyn thus argued, "Nor is right and wrong so difficult to be discerned in Causes and Controversies, but that an ordinary capacity (careful to keep a good conscience, and that is tender of an oath) shall soon perceive the true state thereof;
and be able to do right therein according to evidence."
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Early in the century, King James I had already voiced concerns about juries similar to those Robinson expressed, dismissing the idea that jurors lacking in understanding could still judge according to conscience. In his 1607 Proclamation for Jurors, James both lamented the quality of current juries and set forth plans for altering their composition. 45 Beginning with a positive vision of the jury, James maintained that "it is then laudable and good, when those persons, which serve upon the said Juries, are men of such qualitie, credit and understanding, as are worthy to be trusted with so great a 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid., 9. 45 King James I, Proclamation for Jurors (1607).
charge, as to try mens lives, good names, lands and goods . . . ." 46 Associating such credit and understanding with class status, he then deplored the fact that:
Time and abuse have so embased the estimation of this service, and altered the use thereof, as Sheriffs, Undersheriffes, Bailiffes, and other inferiour Ministers, do not onely spare Gentlemen of qualitie, in a kinde of awe, and unwillingnesse to offend them, but do likewise for lucre, gaine and reward, forbeare to returne many of the ablest and fittest persons: So that the service often time resteth upon such as are either simple and ignorant, and almost at a loss in any cause of difficultie, or else upon those that are so accustomed and inured to pass and serve upon Juries, as they have almost lost that tendernesse of Conscience, which in such cases is to bee wished, and make the service, as it were an occupation and practice.
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Attempting to solve the perceived problem, James employed three devices: instructing his subjects that jury service is a great honor, and urging that "Gentlemen of best qualitie doe put away that vaine and untrue conceit, that they are any wayes disgraced, or disesteemed, if they be called upon or used in this part of Justice, to be tryers of the fact,
Knowing that all Judgement is Gods principally, and by him committed unto us within the Precinct of our Kingdomes, as his Minister upon Earth, to whom likewise they are subordinate"
48
; directing everyone involved in the judicial process to round up all freeholders for jury service-but to take care as well that no one be called too often; and, finally, assuring that he would grant a moderate number of exemptions to well-placed jurors in order to mitigate the effects of the change in policy. At the same time as 19 advocating for juries, James thus attempted to ensure that they would be composed of those upon whom-like the Chancellor-he would not be ashamed to place the imprimatur of his judicial power.
III PROCEDURAL PARADIGMS: FACT, LAW, AND FINALITY
Several other commonalities between the jury and the Chancellor depended on their modes of proceeding. It was part of the special capacity of the Chancellor that he could examine witnesses-including the defendant-under oath, and take into account circumstances outside the case. 49 This investigatory power was paralleled by that of jurors taken from the vicinity, who had access to circulating rumors, as well as the witnesses to a crime. As Hobbes wrote, presumably against those who lauded the jury's ability to elicit evidence, "nor is a Jury more capable of duly examining Witnesses than a Lord-Chancellor." 50 A correlate of this ability to make factual determinations was the jury's and the Chancellor's authority to decide cases on the basis of both fact and law.
While opponents of the jury contested its capacity to interpret the law, enemies of Chancery rejected its fact-finding power. Finally, neither a general jury verdict for a defendant nor the Chancellor's decision was fully appealable.
A) Evidence
Seventeenth-century writers often noted the apparent disparities between the collection of evidence at common law and that practiced in equity. Recent work has 20 demonstrated that these divergences were not as vast as had earlier been supposed. 51 Although the tradition of the self-informing jury had entered a period of relative disuse by the reign of James I, it still commanded nominal respect in Bushel's Case much later in the century, 52 and provided an emphasis on collateral circumstances that was echoed in the Chancellor's capacity to look beyond facts of specifically legal significance. In addition, contemporaneous discussions about the grand jury suggested that it supplemented the evidentiary method of the petty jury, especially after the latter had ceased to be self-informing.
The Chancellor had at his command a variety of procedural devices that conduced to obtaining evidence: he could issue interrogatories, examine the defendant on oath, and subpoena witnesses. 53 Although official recognition of his authority to employ these techniques differentiated his fact-finding capacity from that of the jury, one can envision the jury attaining similar results through a less formal method of investigation. During the period when the jury was self-informing, jury members might of their own accord 51 Michael R.T. Macnair has argued that "The intervention of courts of equity may . . . have furnished an important pressure driving the development of rules of evidence to a jury at common law." Macnair, Law of Proof, 288. In the effort to explain why, despite increasing congruencies between evidentiary practices in equity and common law during the seventeenth century, lawyers and tract writers continued to insist upon the differences, he writes that:
[T]he question of proof rules became intimately connected with more general debates about the 'ancient constitution' and the role of the jury. Connecting the question of proof/evidence in this way with the political-ideological debate over the jury helps . . . with the chronology of relations between equity and law; it is at the same period, the later seventeenth and early eighteenth century, at which a connection to political history would lead one to expect an ascendancy of 'common law' ideology, that we also find the first assertions that equity follows the law in relation to witnesses . . . ." Ibid. 52 Macnair, Law of Proof, 21-22. 53 See generally, Macnair, Law of Proof.
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independently examine witnesses not brought to court or assess the defendant's and plaintiff's reputations in the community. Likewise, while the defendant was not required or even allowed to give testimony under oath in the common law courts, the oath requirement in Chancery was displaced in King's Bench onto the jury members themselves as witnesses, who could be-and eventually were-severely punished for violating their oaths and not returning a true verdict. 54 When the petty jury's self-informing quality had become nominal rather than actual, the grand jury became the repository of powers analogous to those of the self-informing quality of the petty jury, the grand jury appeared to take over its evidentiary role.
B) Law and Fact
As the vehemence of Babington's assertion that the grand jurors cannot be judges of fact and law suggests, debate was fierce over whether jurors could find law as well as fact during the second half of the seventeenth century. Thomas Green has demonstrated that, although the petty jury had previously exercised a de facto ability to determine law as well as fact-and hence to nullify-it was in tracts between the 1653 trial of Leveller This account thus imagined a verdict on the law as growing organically out of an adjudication of the facts.
If opponents of the jury were eager to demonstrate that it was permitted only to decide the facts, not the law, adversaries of Chancery criticized the equitable methods of fact-finding while acknowledging that the Chancellor could determine the law. 65 Hobbes, in his Dialogue, voicing the view of those who advocated equity against the common law, maintained that one of the primary distinctions between the two was that the judge in equity could announce both the facts and the law, whereas the jury was limited to a declaration of the facts; as the Philosopher of the Dialogue argues, "In the Connected to the issue of whether the judge or the jury should find facts at common law was the relationship between the jury's special and general verdicts. As
Coke had described the special verdict in his Institutes, it allowed the jury to present a decision on the facts to the judge and request that he apply the law to those facts:
Discretion ought to be thus described. severe, it shall lie at your door." 69 This answer suggests that if, in theory, judges scorned the claim that the jury could decide on the law, in practice, they preferred to abdicate responsibility and substitute the jury's exercise of rigor or leniency for their own.
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C) Finality
The indistinction in the relationship between law and fact in the jury's determination conduced pragmatically to the unappealability of a general verdict. Two strands of this issue bearing upon the relationship between jury trial and Chancery emerged during the seventeenth century and continued to retain significance through the period of the Founding. On the one hand, Lord Coke, among other advocates of the common law, emphatically insisted that verdicts reached at common law in courts of the King's Bench could not be revisited in equity-and likewise attempted to constrain within legal limits the royal power of pardoning exercised through Chancery. This concern reappeared in writings at the time of the Founding expressing fears about the Supreme Court's ability to hear appeals, worries voiced through derogatory comparisons 69 Ibid., 57. 70 Hawles, in The English-mans Right, similarly discussed the relationship between the jury's general verdict and its ability to decide on the law:
[T]hough the direction as to matter of law separately may belong to the Judg, and the finding the matter of Fact does peculiarly belong to the Jury, yet must your Jury also apply matter of Fact and Law together; and from their consideration of, and a right judgment upon both, bring forth their Verdict: For do we not see in most general issues, as upon not guilty, pleaded in trespass, breach of the peace, or Felony, though it be matter in Law whether the party be a trespasser, a breaker of the Peace, or a Felon; yet the Jury do not find the Fact of the case by it self, leaving the Law to the Court; but find the party guilty, or not guilty, generally. So as though they answer not to the question singly, what is Law; yet they determine the law in all matters where Issue is join'd. . . . Now do they not therein complicatedly resolve both Law and Fact? Hawles, The English-mans Right, 11.
of the planned Supreme Court with Chancery. 71 On the other hand, seventeenth-century writers on both Chancery and the jury trial emphasized the finality of decisions-and, in particular, those of acquittal-in both contexts. Although juries during the seventeenth century began to experience increasing pressure to conform their verdicts to the judge's view of the case-either during the trial itself or through the threat of a subsequent accusation against them-these measures did not contradict but were rather symptomatic of the jury verdict's conclusive quality, and, in any event, were eliminated by the outcome in Bushel's Case, which affirmed the principle that jurors could not be coerced.
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While Coke's efforts to delimit the scope of equity jurisdiction and protect common law courts from its interference were quite controversial when he articulated them, 73 they elaborated a paradigm that became widely accepted later in the seventeenth century. 74 As Coke specified in his Third Institute, explaining that an act codifying certain restrictions on equity jurisdiction merely cemented a long-standing tradition, "This court [of equity] cannot proceed in course of equity after judgment at the common law. . . . And this is the ancient law at all times used, as this act speaketh." 75 Among the reasons he adduced were the differences between the courts' methods of procedure, 76 that
[A]fter judgment the parties ought to be at peace and quiet, for judicia sunt tanquam juris dicta [judgments are, as it were, statements of the law], and if the party against whom judgment is given, might after judgment given against him at the common law, goe into court of equity for matter in equity, there either should be no end of suits, or every plaintif would leave the common law, and begin in the court of equity, whither in the end he must be brought, and that should tend to the utter subversion of the common law . . . .
78
Coke did not explicitly mention the jury trial here-although his comments about equity courts' manner of examining witnesses recall arguments adduced for and against the jury's manner of proceeding-but later commentators have associated the finality upon which he insists with preservation of the jury's power to determine law and fact. predictably, given the events of the century-as the jury's autonomy became increasingly impenetrable, the Chancellor's decisions became more and more subject to review.
IV THE AMERICAN INHERITANCE
The influence of these seventeenth-century discussions about the scope of the Chancellor's and the jury's authority manifests itself even in debates from the Founding Period over the jurisdiction that the future Supreme Court should exercise. Under Article III, the judicial power extends to "all Cases in Law and Equity," within the purview of the federal courts and the Supreme Court possesses "appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact." 86 These clauses-as well as the explicit, constitutionally enshrined protection for juries in criminal but not in civil cases-spawned considerable anxiety during the period leading up to ratification, and even subsequently during debates about the Judiciary Act of 1789. "Appeal" was, at the time of the Founding, understood by some as a civil law procedure, to be distinguished from the common law "writ of error." 87 appellate jurisdiction over decrees in equity and that they "then discerned the difference between exercising a general appellant jurisdiction over suits in equity under a claim of an authority inherent to their order, and exercising appellant jurisdiction over suits at law under the sanction and delegation of a writ of error issued by the crown. We are told, as an additional proof, that the trial by jury was intended to be given up; 'that appeals are unknown to the common law; that the term is a civil-law term, and with it the civil law is intended to be introduced.' I confess I was a good deal surprised at this observation being made; for Blackstone, in the very volume which the honorable member (Mr. Smilie) had in his hand, and read us several extracts from, has a chapter entitled 'Of Proceeding in the Nature of Appeals,'-and in that chapter says, that the principal method of redress for erroneous judgments, in the king's courts of record, is by writ of error to some superior point; for if the jurisdiction of the jury be not final, as to facts, it is of little or no importance."
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While dismay was most palpable over appeal from jury determinations of fact, many critics of the system also insisted on the inseparability of law and fact within the jury's general verdict-a concatenation that contributed, in their view, to the inadvisability of permitting the Supreme Court to hear appeals. Speaking of civil casessince the Constitution did ensure a jury trial for criminal matters-the Federal Farmer asserted, "I hold it is the established right of the jury by the common law, and the fundamental laws of this country, to give a general verdict in all cases when they chuse to do it, to decide both as to law and fact, whenever blended together in the issue put to them. Their right to determine as to fact will not be disputed, and their right to give a general verdict has never been disputed, except by a few judges and lawyers, governed by radically reduce the protections for liberty enshrined in the institution of the jury trial.
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As he expostulated, using the rhetoric of equity to favor the jury trial rather than the "foreign" innovations represented by courts like Chancery:
The in fact, there can not be any thing more absurd than a distinction between law and equity. . . . At any rate, it seems to me that there is much more equity in a trial by jury, than in an appellate jurisdiction from the fact.
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By thus associating appeals with Chancery and the determination of fact and law, he suggested how an institution like the Supreme Court could be seen as replacing the jury trial precisely because it would fulfill a comparable role.
Not simply content with opposing the idea of appeals and the Chancery model to the jury trial, he further criticized the status of the Supreme Court in a manner analogous to that in which some seventeenth-century commentators noted and disapproved
Chancery's relation to the King's prerogative. Hypothesizing a situation in which federal officials would oppress local individuals, he wrote:
94 A Democratic Federalist, Storing 3.5.5-9 (17 Oct. 1787). 95 Ibid.
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Suppose therefore, that the military officers of congress, by a wanton abuse of power, imprison the free citizens of America, suppose the excise or revenue officers . . . -that a constable, having a warrant to search for stolen goods, pulled down the clothes of a bed in which there was a woman, and searched under her shift,-suppose, I say, that they commit similar, or greater indignities, in such cases a trial by jury would be our safest resource, heavy damages would at once punish the offender, and deter others from committing the same: but what satisfaction can we expect from a lordly court of justice, always ready to protect the officers of government against the weak and helpless citizen, and who will perhaps sit at the distance of many hundred miles from the place where the outrage was committed? 96 Institutionally, the Supreme Court resembled Chancery in its affiliation with a centralized government rather than local self-determination, and, like Chancery, it was located some distance away from the site of most cases it would adjudicate. Although the Supreme Court was not envisioned as a second Chancery for long, the eventual disappearance of the association may speak more to the power of naming than to the distinctions between the institutions.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 may itself be partly responsible for mitigating fears about the Supreme Court's exercise of jurisdiction. Under the Act, use of the "writ of error" rather than the appeal as the mechanism for reviewing lower court decisions ensured that the Supreme Court would not revisit the facts of a particular case. 97 Senator inviolate, not only from all open attacks, (which none will be so hardy as to make) but also from all secret machinations, which may sap and undermine it; by introducing new and arbitrary methods of trial, by justices of the peace, commissioners of the revenue, and courts of conscience.
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The stark opposition that Blackstone drew-a contrast relied upon by the Framers and others at the time of the Founding-derived not as much from inherent disparities in ideals and methods of adjudication as in a struggle for authority, one in which common law and jury were often, although not always, aligned against the power of the Chancellor, who represented the ineluctable and dreaded prerogative of the King.
Precisely because advocates of both Chancery and the jury insisted upon their capacity to judge according to conscience rather than the intricacies of precedent or the letter of statutory law, neither trusted the others' exercise of such discretion, possibly believing that the oaths of the decision-makers were hardly sufficient to prevent abuse, or perhaps denying that the conscience of a Chancellor could be substantively the same as that of a jury. Whichever was the case, these legal combatants bequeathed upon the Founding generation an inheritance sufficiently ambiguous that most could be satisfied with enshrining the criminal trial jury while at the same time creating a Supreme Court that echoed Chancery in all but name.
